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Note
Preponderance, Plus: The Procedure Due to
Professional Licensees in State Revocation Hearings
ALLAINA M. MURPHY
A licensee who is subjected to professional discipline often experiences harsh
and stigmatizing consequences as a result: humiliation; disgrace; loss of reputation,
livelihood, and client base. Unfortunately, this, at times, happens on the basis of an
unsubstantiated complaint. Procedural due process protections apply to
professional license revocation actions to help prevent such error, but states vary
widely in the combination and strength of the procedural safeguards they require in
such hearings. It is far more likely that an undeserving professional will be unfairly
and permanently harmed in a state with minimal procedural safeguards. This Note
focuses on procedural due process issues in state administrative professional
license revocation hearings—specifically, whether, and under which circumstances,
the preponderance of the evidence standard provides sufficient due process for
licensed professionals in administrative disciplinary hearings. This Note argues
that “preponderance alone” is not sufficient when a state has no other safeguards
in place. However, preponderance of the evidence may be appropriate in states that
do have additional procedural safeguards in place—a standard termed
“preponderance, plus.”
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Preponderance, Plus: The Procedure Due to
Professional Licensees in State Revocation Hearings
ALLAINA M. MURPHY *
INTRODUCTION
A license is defined as: “permission to act.”1 Under its legal definition,
a license is “[t]he certificate or document evidencing such permission.”2
Professional licenses play an important role in the lives of every American.
Whether working in a profession that requires they be licensed, or requiring
a service provided by professionals in those professions, every American
encounters a professional license on a regular basis. Licensing is required
for more than three-quarters of jobs in healthcare, more than two-thirds of
jobs in the legal profession, and more than half of jobs in education. This
accounts for approximately twenty-three percent of the U.S. workforce,
according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.3 But also, approximately
2.8 million jobs are lost annually because of licensing issues.4
Licensing laws are implemented with the intent to protect public health
and safety by creating barriers to employment—through testing, training,
and fees—in professions determined to be sufficiently dangerous.5 As such,
a professional who has obtained a license has presumptively met the
requisite level of competency and qualification, and once the state has
granted a professional his license, the licensee has a due process protected
property interest in the license:
The kind of property interests that due process encompasses
extends beyond the actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or
*

University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. 2020; Bates College, B.A. 2015. I would like to
extend my sincerest thanks to the members of the Connecticut Law Review for their thoughtful editing,
diligence, and support throughout this process. Also, I would like to thank my Note Editor for his patient
guidance throughout the drafting process. Finally, thank you to my parents, for everything else.
1
License, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/license (last
visited May 27, 2020).
2
License, B LACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
3
U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY 1, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat49.htm (last updated Jan. 22, 2020).
4
MARK FLATTEN, GOLDWATER INST., PROTECTION RACKET: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LAWS
AND THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING 5 (2017), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/protection-racketoccupational-licensing-laws-and/.
5
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS., NATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING DATABASE EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/occupationallicensing-statute-database.aspx.

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

946

[Vol. 52:2

money to include legitimate claims of entitlement to
governmental benefits. . . . “Much of the existing wealth in this
country takes the form of rights that do not fall within
traditional common-law concepts of property. It has been aptly
noted that ‘[s]ociety today is built around entitlement. The
automobile dealer has his franchise, the doctor and lawyer
their professional licenses, the worker his union membership,
contract, and pension rights, the executive his contract and
stock options; all are devices to aid security and
independence.6
Due process protections apply to license revocation actions by the state. The
government cannot deprive the individual of an issued license to practice in
the profession without the appropriate procedural safeguards. There are
harsh and stigmatizing consequences of license discipline—humiliation,
disgrace, loss of reputation and client base. This, at times, happens on the
basis of an unsubstantiated complaint, making those procedural
safeguards—notice, hearing, and perhaps, evidentiary standard—all the
more important.
This Note focuses on procedural due process issues in state
administrative professional license revocation hearings. Specifically, this
Note focuses on whether—and under which circumstances—the
preponderance of the evidence standard provides sufficient due process for
licensed professionals in administrative disciplinary hearings. It concludes
that “preponderance alone” is not enough and additional safeguards must be
in place. The preponderance of the evidence standard may be sufficient in
states that have other procedural safeguards in place—“preponderance,
plus.” In states that lack such safeguards, a higher evidentiary standard of
clear and convincing evidence is required to satisfy due process.
Part I of this Note examines the state licensing boards. It begins with the
background, function, and policy of state licensing boards as part of the state
administrative system. It discusses the background and policy of states
delegating authority to such boards, and the disciplinary measures licensing
boards are authorized to carry out. Part I culminates in a discussion of the
board’s authority to revoke licenses in disciplinary hearings.
While there is a basic process that most states follow—at times, with
minimal procedural safeguards for the licensee—for disciplinary hearings,
each state formulates its own procedural rules and there is much variation
among the fifty states. Part II discusses many of these differences, compares
various revocation practices, and discusses potential procedural due process
6

J. Bruce Bennett, The Rights of Licensed Professionals to Notice and Hearing in Agency
Enforcement Actions, 7 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 205, 208 (2006) (footnote omitted) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970)).
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issues in license revocation hearings. Perhaps the most striking difference
between states is that currently, thirty-two states have a preponderance of
the evidence standard and sixteen states maintain a clear and convincing
standard in disciplinary hearings for professional licensees.7 This split has
given rise to much debate on which standard is required by procedural due
process.
Part III builds on this discussion of the state differences and analyzes the
state split of evidentiary standards in the quest to determine whether the
preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies procedural due process.
This discussion entails the stated rationales and policy implications of each
side, as well as the additional procedural safeguards that each side has in
place. This analysis concludes that the preponderance of the evidence
standard alone—without additional procedural safeguards in place—is
insufficient procedural due process for licensees.8 This Note suggests that
the “plus” required when the preponderance of the evidence standard is
utilized is a proper separation of roles and powers—and biases—within the
adjudicatory process.
The following discussion will solely reference professional licenses
from the medical and dental fields so that tangible public risk and policy
concerns can be equitably accounted for.
I. STATE PROFESSIONAL LICENSING BOARDS
A. Background, Purpose, and Public Policy
Administrative agencies first entered the United States legal landscape
in 1865 to assist with an expanding government under President Johnson.9
Administrative law has greatly expanded in the last 150 years and, today,
agencies have wide discretion and authority far beyond that originally
imagined.10 This growing authority is due, in part, to the fact that agencies
7
FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS 67 (2018),
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/publications/us-medical-regulatory-trends-actions.pdf
[hereinafter FSMB]. The Federation of State Medical Boards is the national association of medical and
osteopathic boards.
8
Because of the vast number of state professional and occupational statutes and independent
processes, which vary both by state and profession, the following discussion is necessarily limited in
scope. The body of this Note focuses on professional licenses over occupational licenses, with special
attention to disciplinary processes, over all other functions and powers of state licensing boards. The
majority of the discussion is based on medical board sources. However, most professions contain the
same standard, with the exception of attorney licensing which typically uses a clear and convincing
standard in most states.
9
See A Brief History of Administrative Government, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T,
https://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3461 (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (discussing 1865, a year that
Andrew Johnson was President, as the beginning of independent regulatory commissions).
10
See Judah A. Schechter, De Novo Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Factual
Determinations Implicating Constitutional Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1483, 1483 (1988) (making it
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wield powers of each of the three principal branches of government.11 The
statutes under which most agencies operate give them: (1) the legislative
power to issue rules and the authority to issue penalties for violation of those
rules; (2) the executive power to investigate potential violations of rules and
prosecute offenders; and (3) the judicial power to adjudicate disputes over
failure to comply with the standard.12
State administrative agencies mirror federal agencies: most states enact
a state administrative procedure act or follow the Revised Model State
Administrative Procedure Act,13 agencies derive power from authorizing
statutes,14 and agencies oversee a specific field. State agencies more
significantly impact the everyday lives of individuals than many federal
agencies. In several states, as many as seventy independent agencies make
rules and adjudicate contested cases affecting the lives, health, fortunes,
safety, labor, and business of millions of citizens.15 More than two thousand
state administrative agencies exercise both legislative and judicial
functions.16 In carrying out their duties, these agencies are largely
independent of the legislature and the courts.
A state licensing board, authorized to regulate the corresponding
profession for the general welfare of its citizens,17 is one of the most
prevalent state agencies for American citizens. A person seeking to practice
in a particular profession must first obtain, and then retain, a license from
the state in which they hope to practice.18

clear that the Founding Fathers “envisioned a judicial system in which most adjudication would take
place in judicial, not administrative, tribunals”).
11
1 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 25–26 (1965).
12
Id.
13
REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=f184fb0c-5e31-4c6d8228-7f2b0112fa42 (last visited Mar. 22, 2019).
14
See Pork Motel Corp. v. Kan. Dep’t of Health & Env’t, 234 Kan. 374, 378 (1983)
(“Administrative agencies are creatures of statute and their power is dependent upon authorizing statutes;
therefore, any exercise of authority claimed by agency must come from within the statutes . . . no general
or common law power that can be exercised by an administrative agency.”).
15
1 COOPER, supra note 11, at 1–2.
16
Id. at 2.
17
Tara K. Widmer, South Dakota Should Follow Public Policy and Switch to the Preponderance
Standard for Medical License Revocation After In Re the Medical License of Dr. Reuben Setliff, M.D.,
48 S.D. L. REV. 388, 396 (2003).
18
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (“The power of the state to provide for the
general welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure
or tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity, as well as of deception and
fraud.”). Licensing is required for more than three-quarters of jobs in healthcare, more than two-thirds of
jobs in the legal profession, and more than half of the jobs in education. Labor Force Statistics from the
Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/cps/aa2016/cpsaat53.htm
(last updated Feb. 8, 2018).
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In the American federalist system, the authority to issue most licenses
lies at the state level, within the purview of each state’s police power.19 The
Supreme Court first confirmed the constitutionality of licensing
requirements in Dent v. West Virginia,20 where the Court considered a state
law requiring that a physician graduate from a reputable medical school and
pass a qualifying examination or prove that he had practiced medicine in the
state for a period of ten years in order to practice medicine.21 The Court
acknowledged that because every individual has a right to pursue a lawful
occupation, the legislature cannot arbitrarily prevent a person from working
in the occupation of his choice,22 but a state may adopt a licensing scheme
as a means of protecting public health and safety.23
In the past seventy years, there has been a large increase in the number
of regulatory agencies that license and regulate businesses and
professionals.24 In the 1950s, the U.S. economy was based on
manufacturing, and less than five percent of all workers in the United States
were required to have a license to do their jobs.25 Today’s economy is more
19

U.S. CONST. amends. X, XIV. See, e.g., Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926)
(“[T]here is no right to practice medicine which is not subordinate to the police power of the states.”);
Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1197 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding Florida license requirement for interior
designers constitutional), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1004 (2012); Onyiuke v. N.J. State Supreme Court, 435
F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 (D.N.J. 2006) (holding state rule requiring graduation from accredited law school
as prerequisite to licensure rationally related to “legitimate interests in ensuring high standards of
qualification”), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Onyiuke v. New Jersey, 242 F. App’x 794 (3d Cir.
2007); Walker v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of Superior Court of Tenn., 38 S.W.3d 540, 550 (Tenn.
2001) (finding regulation that required attorneys to disclose specialty certification in advertisements was
valid). For information on federal licenses, see Federal Licenses & Permits, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.,
http://www.sba.gov/content/what-federal-licenses-and-permits-does-your-business-need (last visited
Mar. 22, 2019).
20
129 U.S. at 128.
21
Id. at 124–25.
22
Id. at 121–24 (citations omitted).
23
Id. at 122. Although the states’ power to license was not confirmed by the Supreme Court until
1889, state regulation of professional licenses began as early as the mid-1700s. See Kathleen L. Blaner,
Comment, Physician Heal Thyself: Because the Cure, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, May
Be Worse Than the Disease, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 1073, 1078 (1988) (“As early as 1760, colonies created
boards of medical examiners to evaluate individuals seeking to practice medicine and to issue licenses to
those individuals the boards found qualified.”). And, professional licensing boards and societies
originated after the Civil War, when societies enacted standards to use as a measure of the professional’s
competency in disciplinary actions. Id. at 1078–79.
24
See Mary Feighny & Camille Nohe, A Species Unto Themselves: Professional Disciplinary
Actions, 71 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 29, 29 (2002) (“In Kansas, a person can’t cut hair, trim beards, give legal
advice, perform surgery, clean teeth, embalm bodies, fill prescriptions, neuter cats, design buildings, or
pierce bodies without getting the State’s blessing. This means that an applicant for such sanctions needs
to satisfy a regulatory body that he or she has satisfied certain prerequisites designed to ensure a minimum
level of competency. Once permission is secured, a licensee must then comply with rules by the agency
or risk losing the privilege to practice that profession.”). For a comprehensive list of all professions that
LAB.,
require
a
state
regulated
license,
see
License
Finder,
U.S.
DEP’T
https://www.careeronestop.org/toolkit/training/find-licenses.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2020).
25
FLATTEN, supra note 4, at 5.
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service-oriented, and as such, between twenty-five and thirty percent of
workers must have a license from the government.26 While some of this
growth can be attributed to changes in workforce (more people are doing
jobs that have long required a license), the last half of the twentieth century
saw an explosion in the number of occupations subject to regulation, and
approximately two-thirds of the growth occurred because previously
unlicensed jobs have been added to the list of those regulated.27 The
Supreme Court has outlined the parameters of the state’s police power
regarding licenses: “States have a compelling interest in the practice of
professions within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to protect
the public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to
establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of
professions.”28
State legislatures create licensure boards to oversee certain professions
and give boards the authority to discipline anyone who violates the rules,
regulations, ethics, or other standards of the profession.29 The role of the
licensure boards is to protect consumers from professionals who fail to
maintain the requisite standards.30 It is in a state’s interest to ensure that only
qualified practitioners serve the public.31 The goal of state licensing boards
is to protect the public against unprofessional, improper, unauthorized, and
unqualified practice, as well as to secure for the public the services of

26

Id.
THE WHITE HOUSE, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 3, 6
(2015). For a list of occupations that require a license, see 2 DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR
JUSTICE, LICENSE TO WORK: A NATIONAL STUDY OF BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 13
(2017). See also id. at 44–144 (listing states and their licensing requirements).
28
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). Usually, the power to issue a license and
oversee licensee is through a state administrative agency. See, e.g., 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.00 (2012)
(“Disciplinary Proceedings for Physicians”).
29
See Richard Waring, What Your Licensing Board Expects of You, in THE MENTAL HEALTH
PRACTITIONER AND THE LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK 101, 101 (Lawrence E. Lifson & Robert
I. Simon eds., 1998) (“Despite the fact that the federal government regulates and finances medical
practice in the United States in an extensive way, the licensing and disciplining of physicians is
exclusively a function of state government.”). See infra Appendix A for a list of citations for each state
administrative procedure act. The state APAs lay out the basic requirements for licensing that are
particular to each state. The professions that are licensed in every state are: health related occupations,
attorneys, accountants, barbers, cosmetologists, truck drivers, teachers, pesticide applicators, funeral
directors, school bus drivers, and athletic trainers. 2 CARPENTER, supra note 27, at 44–144. Although
these are universally licensed occupations, states vary tremendously with respect to the experience and
training required for licensure. For example, a barber in Maryland is required to complete 280 days of
experience and education, where in Idaho, a barber is required to complete 630 days of experience and
education. Id. at 68, 85.
30
See infra Part II for a discussion on the public policy supporting licensing boards.
31
Feighny & Nohe, supra note 24, at 29.
27
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32

competent and trustworthy practitioners. Regulatory and disciplinary
authority allow state licensing boards to carry out these goals.33
The following discussion will solely reference professional licenses
from the medical, dental, and legal fields so that a tangible and agreed upon
public risk can be accounted for.
B. Constitutional Sources of Licensed Professionals’ Procedural Rights
To carry out their policy and regulatory goals, licensing boards need the
ability to revoke licenses from practitioners who pose a harmful risk to
public welfare and safety. However, this authority is necessarily limited by
procedural safeguards to protect the licensees: “This right to choose one’s
calling is an essential part of that liberty which it is the object of government
to protect; and a calling, when chosen, is a man’s property and right. Liberty
and property are not protected where these rights are arbitrarily assailed.”34
The United States Constitution, and most state constitutions, contain a
clause providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. The “touchstone” of due process is the
protection of the individual from the arbitrary action of the government,35
meaning that procedural due process protects a person from an erroneous or
mistaken deprivation of life, liberty, or property by guaranteeing the
application of fair procedures.36 Due process is “flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”37 The
“procedure due” is not universally applicable to every situation.
The discussion of the requisite due process required in administrative
hearings was first discussed in depth in 1970 when the Supreme Court
decided Goldberg v. Kelly.38 In Goldberg, welfare beneficiaries in New
York claimed their payments were terminated without due process of law.39
The welfare program in question was based on a system of statutory
entitlements where all applicants who met the conditions were entitled to
32

Id. There is no clear health and safety benefit to regulating most of the currently licensed
occupations. FLATTEN, supra note 4, at 5. Only about thirty professions (most of which are medical,
dental, mental health, and legal) are licensed in all fifty states and many are licensed in only one state.
Critics suggest this shows that licensing is unnecessary for most occupations: if a license is issued in only
one state, and people in the other forty-nine states do not suffer harm, then there is no reason to believe
that the license is necessary to protect consumers. Id.
33
Approximately 2.8 million jobs are lost annually because of licensing. FLATTEN, supra note 4, at
5.
34
The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 51 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
35
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557–58 (1974).
36
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125
(1990).
37
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
38
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
39
Id. at 260.
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40

receive public assistance. The Court said that consideration of what
procedures due process requires under any given set of circumstances begins
with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved, as well as the private interest affected by the governmental
action.41 As a result, the State had to afford due process safeguards before it
could terminate the benefits. The Court held that the welfare recipients in
New York had to be afforded an evidentiary hearing before they were
terminated from the program.42 At the hearing, they would be entitled to
safeguards that had historically been available in court proceedings: the right
to present a case orally, to confront an adverse witness, and to receive a
decision based exclusively on the hearing record.43
Six years later, the Court again revisited the question of what level of
process was due in an administrative hearing when it decided Mathews v.
Eldridge.44 This time, the Court considered whether those receiving Social
Security disability benefit payments were entitled to an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of the benefits.45 The Court
established a three-factor test to determine which level of process is due in
administrative hearings:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.46
The Court held that applying this balancing test would illuminate the
appropriate level of process due in any given circumstance.47 Federal and
state administrative agencies have since applied the Mathews test.
The type of property interests that due process encompasses extends
beyond physical ownership of real estate, chattels, or money and includes
claims of entitlements to government benefits,48 and the guarantee of
40

Id. at 262.
Id. at 263 (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
42
Id. at 264.
43
Id. at 267–68.
44
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
45
Id. at 323–24.
46
Id. at 335.
47
Id.
48
Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1972); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262
n.8 (“Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional
common-law concepts of property. It has been aptly noted that ‘[s]ociety today is built around
entitlement. The automobile dealer has his franchise, the doctor and lawyer their professional licenses . . .
all are devices to aid security and independence.” (alteration in original)).
41
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procedural due process limits a state agency’s ability to impair or terminate
that entitlement.49 The Supreme Court has also recognized that the right to
follow a chosen profession is within the liberty and property concepts of due
process of law.50
Because licensed professionals have a property interest associated with
the retention of their licenses, the government cannot deprive professionals
of their license unless procedural due process protections are provided and
followed.51 As such, courts have consistently ruled that, except in emergency
situations, due process requires a state agency to give a licensed professional
meaningful and adequate notice and a meaningful hearing before the
revocation or suspension of the professional’s license.52
C. The Disciplinary Hearing
Due process does not require that every hearing before a state agency
conform to judicial process,53 but does require that a state agency provide
the opportunity for a full and fair hearing on all disputed issues that are
critical to the property interests of the party.54 License revocation entails
such interests.55 A licensed professional has a right to appear personally or
by counsel before an impartial decision maker, to produce witnesses and
evidence on his behalf, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to rebut the
evidence produced against him, and to present reasons—either in person or
in writing—why the proposed action should not be taken.56
49

The U.S. Supreme Court has also pointed out that “minimum [procedural] requirements . . . [are]
a matter of federal law,” and that “they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified
its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official
action.” Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980).
50
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 n.11 (1967).
51
See Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963) (holding that
requirements of procedural due process must be met before a state can exclude a person from practicing
law).
52
“The purpose of notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected individual of, and
permit adequate preparation for, an impending ‘hearing.’” Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft,
436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978). To be meaningful, the notice of a hearing or complaint against an individual “must
set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity” and be given sufficiently in advance to allow the
person a reasonable opportunity to prepare. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967). This means that when a
governmental agency seeks to revoke or suspend a professional’s license, meaningful notice requires that
the professional is timely and fairly advised of the precise nature of the charges and grounds on which
the revocation or suspension is sought.
53
Martinez v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 476 S.W.2d 400, 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
54
See, e.g., Trimble v. Tex. State Bd. of Registration for Prof’l Eng’rs, 387 S.W.2d 876, 876 (Tex.
1965) (holding procedural due process was satisfied by engineer’s attendance at license revocation
hearing with his attorney, where he introduced evidence and called witnesses).
55
This is not a universal opinion, however.
56
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985); Morgan v. United States, 304
U.S. 1, 18–19 (1938). The APA provides a party to a contested case proceeding, which includes license
revocation, with several important procedural rights and protections. These rights and protections include
the following: (1) the right to the assistance of counsel; (2) the right to cross-examine witnesses; (3) the
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A professional licensing board is a state agency, and, as such, its power
is derived from authorizing statutes, it follows a procedural act, and it is
responsible for the regulation of a specific field. State practice acts establish
boards’ missions, structures, and powers, and administrative procedure acts
govern many board processes, especially for promulgating regulations and
holding hearings.57 Boards add specificity to general legislative language
through regulations, guidelines, and internal practices.58 State statutes grant
the authority to conduct disciplinary hearings and ultimately suspend or
revoke licenses.59 In addition to issuing licenses, state boards maintain
standards of practice which they expect professionals to follow.60 If a
professional is found to have committed a violation of practice standards,
the licensing board “[has] the authority to impose discipline, which may
range from a verbal sanction, such as a reprimand, to revocation of the
license.”61
No person has a fundamental right to practice a profession.62 Once a
state issues a license, state law treats it “as a form of property vested in the
licensee that can be suspended or revoked only if the licensee violates valid
regulations imposed by the legislature or by the state . . . agency.”63 A
licensee has a clear expectation of continued enjoyment of a license absent
proof of conduct warranting its suspension, revocation, or withdrawal.

right to have the rules of privilege recognized by law given effect by the agency; (4) upon a showing of
good cause and the payment of estimated costs, the right to have the agency issue subpoenas requiring
the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, records, papers, or other objects that may be
necessary and proper; (5) the right to be notified if the agency takes official notice of any material and
the opportunity to contest such material; (6) the right to engage in pre-hearing discovery; and (7) the right
to have the hearing be untainted by improper ex parte communications with the agency decision-makers.
5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551–558 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116-138).
57
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE DISCIPLINE OF PHYSICIANS: ASSESSING STATE
MEDICAL BOARDS THROUGH CASE STUDIES 11 (2006) [hereinafter DHHS].
58
Id.
59
A “hearing” is a quasi-judicial proceeding that requires a more formal process than other actions
the board may take. The parties to the adjudication must be accorded the traditional safeguards of trial.
The standard of proof to be used in such hearings is laid out in some, but not all, authorizing statutes. See
infra Appendix A (showing some states determine standard of proof through the courts, statutes, or not
at all).
60
Waring, supra note 29, at 105.
61
Id. Though physicians are often used as the example, this is the same across the health field. See
also MARY W. CAZALAS, NURSING AND THE LAW 82 (1978) (“All nurse licensing boards have the
authority to suspend or revoke the license of a nurse found in violation of specified norms of conduct . .
. . Suspension and revocation procedures are usually provided for in the act; however, in some
jurisdictions the procedure is left to the discretion of the board or is contained in general administrative
procedure acts.”).
62
Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926).
63
J. Bruce Bennett, The Rights of Licensed Professionals to Notice and Hearing in Agency
Enforcement Actions, 7 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 205, 211 (2006).
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II. STATES DIFFER IN PROCESS DUE WHEN A STATE AGENCY SEEKS TO
REVOKE OR SUSPEND A PROFESSIONAL LICENSE
As discussed in Part I, one of a licensing board’s two main regulatory
functions is the discipline of professionals. While every disciplinary hearing
has the same basic skeleton—complaint, investigation, formal hearing, and
decision—states vary considerably in the ways they handle this process.
A. State Differences in Process
Complaint resolution typically proceeds through four main stages:
intake, investigation, pre-hearing preparations, and hearing.64
1. Investigation
A complaint filed against a licensee by a third party triggers most
investigations.65 Some boards will fully investigate every complaint they
receive, while others will conduct a precursory investigation before deciding
to devote resources to a full investigation.66 The second approach is
favorable to some states because a proper full investigation is very resource
intensive and states prefer to take steps on the front end of the process to
determine if a full investigation is warranted.67 For instance, in medical
board disciplinary hearings, some states will have nurses and other medical
professionals familiar with the field preliminarily review complaints to
determine whether they warrant a full investigation before allocating the
resources.68 Alternatively, a few states, such as California, subject all
complaints to a “medical consultant” review before assigning them for
investigation in the field.69 As a result, California reports a higher percentage
of cases closed before investigation than many other states.70
The full investigation, consisting of document discovery and interviews,
may be conducted by a single sitting board member, a committee of board
members, board-hired staff investigators, or government-hired staff
investigators who service multiple different agencies.71
64
Id. In some states, such as Maryland and Massachusetts, the board performs all functions of the
disciplinary process—receiving, investigating, and adjudicating complaints and imposing disciplinary
sanctions where appropriate. NICOLE DUBE, OFFICE OF LEGAL RESEARCH, OLR RESEARCH REPORT,
STATE MEDICAL BOARDS IN CONNECTICUT AND OTHER STATES (2009). In other states, such as
Connecticut and Pennsylvania, the boards do not investigate complaints and are only involved in
adjudicating complaints, making final disciplinary decisions, and imposing sanctions. Id.
65
Feighny & Nohe, supra note 24, at 41. However, an audit, inspection, or other source of
information may initiate an investigation.
66
DHHS, supra note 57, at 24–25.
67
Id. at 24.
68
Id. E.g. Maryland, Pennsylvania.
69
Id. at 24–25.
70
Id.
71
DUBE, supra note 64. See infra Appendix A (“Investigator Employment”).
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2. Pre-hearing Preparations
Once the investigator feels he has conducted a thorough investigation,
the results are presented to either a full board or a panel of board members.72
The investigator will often make a recommendation as part of his
presentation. The panel or board determines whether sufficient evidence
exists to warrant a disciplinary hearing, and, depending on state practices,
this may exclude those members from being involved in subsequent
proceedings. This is an informal hearing and the licensees are often not
present; however, state practices vary.73 It is at this stage in the process that
most boards decide whether to drop an investigated case, issue a letter of
warning, or bring formal charges and prosecute the case, keeping significant
sanctions in mind. Many state licensing boards rely on the Attorney
General’s office to provide a lawyer who serves as general counsel and
advises the board in the pre-hearing preparation.74 “The decision to bring
charges is akin to a probable cause determination” in a criminal
proceeding.75 It is during this preliminary stage that certain states provide
licensees with notice by a reasonable service, a copy of the complaint, and a
reasonable amount of time to answer the complaint.76 An accused and
charged licensee has a legal right to request an adjudicatory hearing.77
3. Adjudicatory Hearing
If the board refers the matter to prosecution, and the licensee does not
agree to a consent agreement, then a formal hearing is conducted.78 In
Delaware,79 Massachusetts,80 Minnesota,81 Missouri,82 New Hampshire,83
72

DUBE, supra note 64.
See id. (detailing how in New York, the Office of Professional Medical Conduct investigates and
presents the evidence to a board investigation committee, but if formal charges are brought against the
licensee, another hearing is held before an administrative law judge and a separate three-member board
panel).
74
FSMB, supra note 7, at 24. In many states, this same Assistant Attorney General will also
prosecute the case. See infra Part III for the discussion.
75
DHHS, supra note 57, at 26.
76
Typically, fifteen days. See A LL. FOR NAT. HEALTH, KNOW YOUR STATE’S MEDICAL BOARD
11–80,
https://www.anh-usa.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Know-your-state-medical-board1.pdf
(last visited Mar. 20, 2019) [hereinafter ALLIANCE HEALTH] (showing the State Checklist).
77
DHHS, supra note 57, at 27.
78
“The prosecutor will be given terms under which [he or she] can settle the case. The prosecutor
may be willing to negotiate the settlement terms, but all offers are subject to Board approval and the
prosecutor’s discretion is limited.” Professional Licensing Board Disciplinary Proceedings: Myths and
Realities, HAMEL MARCIN DUNN REARDON & SHEA PC, https://www.hmdrlaw.com/news-tobysarticle.html (last visited July 2, 2020).
79
ALLIANCE HEALTH, supra note 76, at 20.
80
Id. at 36.
81
Id. at 39.
82
Id. at 41.
83
Id. at 46.
73
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New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Tennessee, board
members may not participate in the hearing and decision if they have a
conflict of interest with the practitioner. It is in this process that a singular
board is both (1) bringing charges against the licensee and (2) deciding the
final result of those charges. Some states have attempted to counter this lack
of separation by sending cases to a separate administrative entity.88 States
have different processes for conducting the hearing: (1) the full board hears
evidentiary presentations and legal arguments on each case at both the
preliminary stage and adjudicatory hearing;89 (2) the preliminary
proceedings are presided over by a subset of the board or administrative law
judge, followed by a full hearing before the entire medical board;90 (3) an
administrative court, presided over by an administrative law judge separate
from the board, hears evidentiary presentations and legal arguments on each
case, and the board makes the final disciplinary decision;91 and (4) the case
is sent to a complete separate hearing agency.92 If the board finds against the
licensee, the licensee must appeal the board’s decision to the same board
before seeking judicial review.
The evidentiary standard of proof is the most contested issue of the
adjudicatory hearing. The standard traditionally applied in civil or
administrative hearings is preponderance of the evidence, which requires the
parties to share equally in the risk of error.93 In recent years, some courts
have concluded that it is constitutionally required to use the clear and
convincing standard of proof for license revocation.94 The Supreme Court
84

Id. at 48.
Id. at 51.
86
Id. at 52.
87
Id. at 62.
88
See DHHS, supra note 57, at 27 (explaining that in California, prosecutorial staff is part of the
Health Quality Enforcement Section of the Attorney General’s Office; in Virginia, the Division of
Administrative Proceedings).
89
See infra Appendix A (“Hearing Participants and Procedures”); DHHS, supra note 57, at 27–28.
90
DHHS, supra note 58, at 27–28. For example, Iowa.
91
Id. (detailing that, in some states, the board must strongly consider the discipline recommended
by the administrative law judge or panel).
92
Id. California and Massachusetts send cases to separate hearing agencies. For example, the
medical board in California has a specialized unit called the Medical Quality Hearing Panel. This is a
separate entity that hears evidence and argument. Similarly, Massachusetts has the Massachusetts
Division of Administrative Law Appeals, which is unspecialized and hears matters from many other state
agencies and boards. At the close of the evidence, the hearing officer makes written findings of fact and
law and recommends an outcome to the board. The board decides whether to accept, reject, or modify
the recommendation in issuing a final decision or order. Id.
93
Id. at 14.
94
See, e.g., Ettinger v. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 185 Cal. Rptr. 601, 603 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Davis v. Wright, 503 N.W.2d 814, 819 (Neb. 1993); Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292, 294
(Fla. 1987); Johnson v. Bd. of Governors of Registered Dentists of State of Okla., 913 P.2d 1339, 1347
(Okla. 1996); Nguyen v. Wash. Dep’t of Health Med. Quality Assurance Comm’n, 29 P.3d 689, 697
(Wash. 2001); Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 940–41 (Wyo. 2000).
85
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has mandated the use of a clear and convincing standard of proof only when
the individual interest involved is “particularly important,” and “more
substantial than the mere loss of money,” or when a “significant deprivation
of liberty” is involved.95 The states that have implemented the clear and
convincing standard did so under the contention that more process is due
because the private interests at stake and risk of erroneous harm are so great:
a professional’s license often represents the fulfillment of extensive
educational investment and training, and there are harsh and stigmatizing
consequences of license discipline—humiliation, disgrace, loss of reputation
and client bases, at times on the basis of an unsubstantiated complaint.96
B. Potential Procedural Issues
Depending on which combination of the above procedures a state
utilizes in an adjudication, various procedural due process issues could arise.
These issues include: boards applying vague and subjective standards of
professional conduct; board members serving as investigators, prosecutors,
and decision makers; the absence of procedural protections available in the
context of civil disputes given the informal nature under which boards
operate; and the external pressures boards face in securing tough disciplinary
penalties from government officials and common interest groups.
1. Boards Are Permitted to Apply Vague, Subjective Standards of
Professional Conduct.
Boards are permitted to apply vague, subjective standards of conduct.
Most states’ practicing acts do not contain definitive standards in their
regulations, as it would make prosecuting anyone too difficult. In Nguyen v.
Washington Department of Health Medical Quality Assurance Commission,
the Washington Supreme Court expanded on the risks of erroneous
deprivation when the standard applied is almost entirely subjective:
It is difficult to imagine a more subjective and relative
standard than that applied in a medical discipline proceeding

95
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (regarding termination of parental rights) (quoting
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424–25 (1979) (regarding civil commitment)). From a constitutional
standpoint, the clear and convincing standard has been found to be required as a matter of due process
when the threatened loss resulting from civil proceedings is comparable to the consequences of a criminal
proceeding in the sense that it takes away liberty or permanently deprives individuals of interests that are
clearly fundamental or significant to personal welfare. Id.
96
Nguyen v. Dep’t of Health Med. Quality Assurance Comm’n, 29 P.3d 689, 694 (Wash. 2001)
(“Loss or suspension of the physician’s license destroys his or her ability to practice medicine, diminishes
the doctor’s standing in both the medical and lay communities, and deprives the doctor of the benefit of
a degree for which he or she has spent countless hours and probably tens (if not hundreds) of thousands
of dollars pursuing.”).
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where the minimum standard of care is often determined by
opinion, and necessarily so.97
On the other end of this argument, some courts have claimed that
disciplinary proceedings involve objective facts that professional board
members have special expertise to analyze, thus indicating a minimum risk
of erroneous deprivations.98 There are three issues with this argument,
however. First, many boards’ actions relate to matters outside of clinical
performance or competence.99 Second, most boards have non-practitioner
members from the public100 who are highly susceptible to persuasion by
practitioner members’ opinions. Finally, there is inherent bias present when
a practitioner judges a competitor practitioner.101
2. Some or All Board Members Serve as Investigator, Prosecutor, and
Decision Maker.
Boards and/or their members serve as investigator, prosecutor, and
decision maker. While the Supreme Court has not found that the blending of
functions in state boards itself violates due process,102 certain state courts
have found that it does:
There is high risk [of error] when an agency seeks to revoke a
professional license. . . . [R]evocation proceedings have the
agency acting as investigator, prosecutor, and decision maker.
The risk is increased where . . . a competitor . . . serves as the
investigator and makes prosecutorial recommendations to the
Board.103
Licensing boards are comprised of colleagues who build relationships and
trust. The beliefs and recommendation of one member will inevitably
influence others when there is no separation between functions.

97

Nguyen, 29 P.3d at 696.
In re Polk, 449 A.2d 7, 16 (N.J. 1982) (noting physicians are uniquely qualified judges and the
substantive standards are objective); Gandhi v. Wis. Med. Examining Bd., 483 N.W.2d 295, 300 (Wis.
1992) (noting physicians are likely to be uniquely qualified to understand the evidence and standards).
99
See DHHS, supra note 57, at 14 n.15 (explaining that the Federation model medical practice act
names forty-three disciplinary grounds, including “demonstrated impairment or incompetence” from
substance abuse, “business related offenses” like misleading advertising, and criminal behavior).
100
FSMB, supra note 7, at 48.
101
See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (stating that because “the combination of
investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in
administrative adjudication[, it] has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry”).
102
Id. at 58 (“the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more,
constitute a due process violation”).
103
Johnson v. Bd. of Governors of Registered Dentists, 913 P.2d 1339, 1346 (Okla. 1996).
98
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3. Many of the Procedural Protections Available in the Context of
Civil Disputes Are Absent in the Informal Nature Under Which
Boards Operate.
Many of the procedural protections available in the context of civil
disputes are absent in the informal nature under which boards operate. For
example, administrative hearings are not required to abide by rules of
evidence.104 The common belief is that boards are comprised of experts in
the field, and thus would not be influenced by things such as hearsay. An
attorney who represents physicians in board proceedings wrote:
[B]oard and hospital proceedings . . . are held before panels
comprised mostly of other doctors who are familiar with the
system. The panel members know that before a case ever gets
to a hearing, other medical professionals, during the
investigation . . . already have decided that the doctor has . . .
committed unprofessional conduct. This creates a
predisposition to find against the doctor.105
Some have argued that basic protections such as notice and a hearing are
sufficient due process, but the Supreme Court disagreed in Santosky v.
Kramer.106 Despite the fact that such cases involve all the formalities of civil
trials, the Court nevertheless held that states must employ at least a clear and
convincing standard, observing:
[T]he standard of proof is a crucial component of legal
process, the primary function of which is “to minimize the risk
of erroneous decisions.” . . . Notice, summons, right to
counsel, rules of evidence, and evidentiary hearings are all
procedures to place information before the fact finder. But
only the standard of proof “instruct[s] the fact finder
concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions” he
draws from the information.107

104
See William H. Kuehnle, Standards of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 49 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 829, 831 (2004) (“[T]he statutory law governing evidence in administrative proceedings was
designed to ease the admission and use of relevant evidence from the type of restrictions applied in court
proceedings while still retaining a standard of integrity. This relaxed standard, however, is more
amorphous than the particularized judicial rules of evidence and presents continuing problems of
application.”).
105
Roy G. Spece, Jr. & John J. Marchalonis, Sound Constitutional Analysis, Moral Principle, and
Wise Policy Judgment Require a Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard of Proof in Physician
Disciplinary Proceedings, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 107, 126 (2006).
106
455 U.S. 745 (1982).
107
Id. at 757 n.9 (alteration in original) (quoting Greenholtz v. Neb. Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 13
(1979) and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 357, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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4. Boards Face External Pressures to Secure Tough Disciplinary
Penalties from Government Officials and Common Interest Groups.
Boards face external pressures to secure tough disciplinary penalties
from government officials and common interest groups. Disciplinary boards
are often asked to judge their progress by the number of penalties they
successfully impose.108 As a result, factors other than protecting the public
motivate boards when they chase convictions.
III. ANALYSIS: PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE ALONE IS NOT
SUFFICIENT DUE PROCESS
In trying to determine the level of procedure necessary for professional
licensing hearings to satisfy procedural due process, the evidentiary standard
of proof inevitably plays a large role in the consideration. A higher burden
can supplement for a lack of other procedural safeguards when considering
procedural protections as a whole. This leads to the question of whether the
preponderance of the evidence standard is sufficient due process for
professional license revocation hearings. As this Section will illustrate, the
preponderance of the evidence standard alone is not sufficient due process
in license revocation hearings.
A. State Split: Comparing Preponderance of the Evidence and Clear and
Convincing States
The United States Supreme Court has held that the standard of proof
implicates due process rights in that it serves “to allocate the risk of error
between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the
ultimate decision.”109 Currently, the states are split as to the appropriate
standard in a state license revocation proceeding. Seventeen states have
established a clear and convincing standard of proof through either
legislation or common law.110 Thirty-two states have maintained a
preponderance of the evidence standard, by legislation, common law, or
unspoken tradition.111
108
DHHS, supra note 57, at 5. Boards measure success by only two performance measures: first,
the number of disciplinary sanctions imposed; and second, the timeliness of complaint resolution. Id.
109
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344–45
(1976).
110
FSMB, supra note 7, at 67. See infra Appendix A (“Standards of Proof Required”).
111
See infra Appendix A for a list of cases discussing the appropriate standard for their state. If a
“Standard of Proof Required” is without citation, then it is maintained as “unspoken tradition.” See
Johnson v. Ark. Bd. of Exam’rs in Psychology, 808 S.W.2d 766 (Ark. 1991); Sherman v. Comm’n on
Licensure to Practice the Healing Art, 407 A.2d 595 (D.C. 1979); Eaves v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 467
N.W.2d 234 (Iowa 1991); Rucker v. Mich. Bd. of Med., 360 N.W.2d 154 (Mich. 1984); In re Wang, 441
N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1989); In re Grimm, 635 A.2d 456 (N.H. 1993); In re Polk, 449 A.2d 7 (N.J.
1982); Gallant v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 974 P.2d 814, 816 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); Anonymous v. State Bd.
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1. Preponderance of the Evidence
Thirty-two states maintain a preponderance of the evidence standard in
license revocation hearings: some state courts or legislatures have explicitly
established the standard, while others have no source authority (and refrain
from establishing such authority), but continue to use preponderance of the
evidence because it is typically employed in civil proceedings.112 The
primary policy rationale for maintaining a preponderance of the evidence
standard in license revocation hearings is the protection of the general
welfare of the public. The logic of public protection is very straightforward:
boards should identify unqualified or unfit practitioners and bar them from
practice in the state, which directly protects citizens from them. A
preponderance standard makes this easier. Indirectly, imposition of
sanctions may also lead other practitioners to practice more carefully or to
tailor their practices to their capabilities.113 It is also argued that the clear and
convincing standard would not eliminate or meaningfully reduce the risk of
an erroneous fact finding or determination, but would express a preference
for one side’s interests:114 it reduces the risk of error for the licensee, but
increases the risk for the public.
In In re Polk, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered whether the
State Board of Medical Examiners unconstitutionally revoked the license of
a doctor who was facing various malpractice and professional misconduct
claims.115 In analyzing the due process issue, the court applied the Mathews
balancing test.116 The court determined that a license is a property right, but
has “always [been] subject to reasonable regulation in the public interest”;117
emphasized the right and duty of the government to protect the public,
of Med. Exam’rs, 496 S.E.2d 17 (S.C. 1998); Nguyen v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health Med. Quality
Assurance Comm’n, 29 P.3d 689, 690 n.3 (Wash. 2001) (listing jurisdictions that have asserted the
preponderance standard is sufficient to satisfy due process); Gandhi v. State Med. Examining Bd., 483
N.W.2d 295 (Wis. 1992). Jurisdictions requiring the higher standard of proof: Silva v. Superior Court,
17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Ettinger v. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 185 Cal. Rptr. 601
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987); Rife v. Dep’t of Prof’l
Regulation, 638 So. 2d 542 (Fla. App. 1994); Miss. State Bd. of Nursing v. Wilson, 624 So. 2d 485 (Miss.
1993); Davis v. Wright, 503 N.W.2d 814 (Neb. 1993) (holding that medical discipline, like attorney
discipline, requires clear and convincing standard); Johnson v. Bd. of Governors of Registered
Dentists, 913 P.2d 1339 (Okla. 1996); Robinson v. State ex rel. Okla. State Bd. of Med. Licensure &
Supervision, 916 P.2d 1390 (Okla. 1996); Sobel v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 882 P.2d 606 (Or. Ct. App.
1994); Bernard v. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 465 P.2d 917 (Or. Ct. App. 1970); In re Zar, 434 N.W.2d 598
(S.D. 1989); Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931 (Wyo. 2000); Devous v. Wyo. State Bd. of Med.
Exam’rs, 845 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1993).
112
See infra Appendix A (comparing Alaska and Maryland to Arkansas, Colorado, and Maine, for
example).
113
DHHS, supra note 57, at 8.
114
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983).
115
Polk, 449 A.2d at 11.
116
Id. at 13.
117
Id. at 17.
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assuring its health and safety through regulating the medical profession;118
and ultimately held that the preponderance standard “fairly allocates the risk
of mistake between the[] two parties and sufficiently reduces for both the
risk of an erroneous deprivation.”119
The court held the preponderance standard sufficient for several reasons,
but namely because a license can only be revoked in New Jersey under
“heightened and strict substantive standards,” including “insanity, physical
or mental incapacity, [and] professional incompetence.”120 In re Polk
concluded that the preponderance standard was sufficient to reasonably
guard against mistakes, and thus satisfies the constitutional demands of due
process when balanced with the interests involved.121 New Jersey has other
procedural safeguards in place that counteract the lower evidentiary
standard, such as hiring independent administrative law judges as hearing
officers, and investigators are employed by a different state agency.122
In Gandhi v. State Medical Examining Board, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals emphasized many of the same points as the Polk court.123 Gandhi
recognized the importance of the private interest and the tremendous
deprivation suffered when a medical license is lost, but noted that the license
may be regained at a later date.124 Gandhi emphasized the government’s
obligation to protect the welfare of its citizens, which is “superior to the
privilege of any individual to practice his or her profession.”125 Wisconsin
does not have the same level of procedural separation as New Jersey.126
In North Dakota State Board of Medical Examiners v. Hsu, the North
Dakota Supreme Court examined this issue and reached the same
conclusion.127 Hsu minimized the State’s role as investigator, prosecutor,
and adjudicator—a fact often used to support the clear and convincing
standard.128 Balancing these interests, Hsu upheld the preponderance
standard.129 North Dakota maintains several procedural safeguards that help
counteract the lower evidentiary standard: hearing officers are independent
administrative law judges, and there is a separation of general counsel and
prosecutor.130
118

Id. at 22.
Id. at 15.
120
Id. at 15.
121
Id. at 16–17.
122
See infra Appendix A (New Jersey).
123
Gandhi v. Wis. Med. Examining Bd., 483 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Wis. 1992).
124
Id. at 299.
125
Id.
126
See infra Appendix A (Compare Wisconsin to New Jersey).
127
N.D. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs v. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d 216, 216 (N.D. 2007).
128
Id. at 231.
129
Id. at 230.
130
See infra Appendix A (South Dakota).
119
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2. Clear and Convincing Evidence
“Protection of the public” is the paramount governmental interest
commonly argued to be threatened by utilizing the clear and convincing
standard. However, the full governmental interests include:
(1) protecting the public from physical, financial, or
psychological injury resulting from practitioner “misconduct”;
(2) preserving existing [practitioner-client] relationships and
general public access to practitioners; . . . [(3)] fostering public
security and respect for the law through the symbolic
statement that our society will not tolerate a significant risk of
erroneous deprivations . . . .131
These latter two concerns are best protected by use of the clear and
convincing standard.132
The Court’s opinion in Santosky v. Kramer133 establishes a preliminary
presumption in favor of greater procedural safeguards. In Santosky, the
Court held that the clear and convincing standard is constitutionally
mandated in termination of parental rights cases,134 stating that the “standard
of proof [at a minimum] reflects the value society places on individual
liberty,” and that an elevated standard is constitutionally required when the
individual faces “a significant deprivation of liberty” or “stigma.”135
Santosky further explained that “a stricter standard of proof would reduce
factual error without imposing substantial fiscal burdens upon the State.”136
Some state courts have found this analysis applicable to professional license
revocation hearings.137
In Johnson v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma discussed the standard of proof the Constitution requires
in professional disciplinary proceedings.138 The Court understood a
professional license to be a protected property interest, the loss of which is
penal in character and destroys a professional’s “means of livelihood.”139
Johnson recognized the State’s interest “in the health, safety and welfare of
its citizens,” but considered the risk of erroneous deprivation to be high,
particularly because the state agency is the investigator, prosecutor, and
decision maker.140 When balanced against the interests involved, this high
131

Spece, Jr. & Marchalonis, supra note 105, at 128.
Id.
133
455 U.S. 745 (1982).
134
Id. at 769–70.
135
Id. at 755–56 (alterations omitted) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)).
136
Id. at 767.
137
See infra Appendix A (noting the “Standards of Proof Required” for California, Washington).
138
913 P.2d 1339, 1342 (Okla. 1996).
139
Id. at 1345.
140
Id. at 1346.
132
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risk of error led the Johnson court to hold that due process required clear and
convincing evidence in professional disciplinary proceedings.141 Other than
a higher standard of proof, Oklahoma does not have many procedural
safeguards in place.142
In Painter v. Abels, the Supreme Court of Wyoming, relying on
Johnson, noted the “quasi-criminal” nature of these proceedings.143
Applying the Mathews balancing test, Painter called the private interest
“substantial” and divided the potential loss into three components: (1) the
loss of a property right, (2) the loss of a livelihood, and (3) the loss of
professional reputation.144 Balancing this interest was the “state’s interest in
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens from a medical
licensee’s incompetence or misconduct.”145 Finally, Painter concludes that
the risk of error is high because the same agency investigates, prosecutes,
and decides.146 For these reasons, Painter held that due process requires clear
and convincing evidence.147 Other than a higher standard of proof, Wyoming
does not have many procedural safeguards in place.148
The Washington Supreme Court’s opinion in Nguyen149 details the
private interests at stake in disciplinary proceedings, which favor application
of a clear and convincing standard:
The intermediate clear preponderance standard is required in a
variety of civil situations “to protect particularly important
individual interests,” that is, those interests more important
than the interest against erroneous imposition of a mere money
judgment. Examples of such proceedings include involuntary
mental illness commitment, fraud, “some other quasi-criminal
wrongdoing by the defendant” as well as the risk of having
one’s “reputation tarnished erroneously.” Medical disciplinary
proceedings fit triply within this intermediate category
because they (1) involve much more than a mere money
judgment, (2) are quasi-criminal, and (3) also potentially
tarnish one’s reputation.150
Nguyen also observes that while the interest of the individual may
dictate a higher standard of proof to avoid erroneous deprivation, the higher
141

Id. at 1347.
See infra Appendix A (Oklahoma).
143
998 P.2d 931, 941 (Wyo. 2000).
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
See infra Appendix A (Wyoming).
149
29 P.3d 689 (Wash. 2001).
150
Id. at 693 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)).
142

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

966

[Vol. 52:2

burden vindicates important state interests: society has an important interest
in the standard of practice not falling below the acceptable minimum, and in
ensuring that a practitioner not be erroneously deprived his license, as that
would erroneously deprive the public access to and benefit from his
services.151
Of note, nearly all states apply the clear and convincing evidence
standard to disbarment hearings, regardless of what standard it applies in
medical license revocation hearings.152 This standard is recommended by the
American Bar Association.153 The proclaimed reason for this difference is
that, where disbarment of attorneys is always permanent, there is no “de jure
‘permanent’ punishment for doctors.”154 Unless otherwise specified, a
doctor can reapply for their revoked or suspended license immediately.155
However, while most doctors can reapply to get revoked licenses back, most
do not, making for de facto permanence to the sanction.156
B. Preponderance Alone Is Not Enough
“A process satisfies minimum constitutional requisites inherently due
when it provides adequate safeguards to the citizen confronted by an action
instigated against him by the state. Primary among these safeguards is the
standard of proof.”157
Most state courts that have analyzed the standard under the Mathews
factors and found preponderance of the evidence sufficient have done so
because they have other procedural safeguards in place that downplay the
risk of erroneous deprivation.158 It is clear that use of the preponderance of
the evidence standard alone is not sufficient to provide licensees with due
process of law.159 Instead, for states to apply preponderance of the evidence
151

Id.
See 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 142 (noting that all but Alaska, Arkansas, Kentucky, and
North Dakota maintain a preponderance of the evidence standard for attorney disciplinary proceedings).
153
MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENF’T r. 18 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“shall be
established by clear and convincing evidence”). There is no American Medical Association equivalent.
154
Milton Heumann, Brian Pinaire & Jennifer Lerman, Prescribing Justice: The Law and Politics
of Discipline for Physician Felony Offenders, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 21 (2007).
155
Id.
156
Id. Additionally, this does not consider that many practitioners’ practices are permanently ruined
due to diminished public perception and good will that accompanies even a preliminary complaint, let
alone a full revocation.
157
Nguyen v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health Med. Quality Assurance Comm’n, 29 P.3d 689, 691
(Wash. 2001).
158
See discussion infra Section III.B.1 (explaining how New Jersey uses a preponderance of the
evidence standard, but has numerous safeguards in place to balance against the lower standard). But see
discussion infra Section III.B.2 (explaining how although Maine has a preponderance of the evidence
standard, it does not have other procedural safeguards in place, resulting in a higher likelihood of
erroneous deprivation).
159
See discussion infra Section III.B.2 (demonstrating that Maine’s lack of additional procedural
safeguards beyond the preponderance of the evidence standard is insufficient).
152
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in license revocation hearings and yet maintain appropriate procedural due
process, there must be additional safeguards in place to protect the
licensee—preponderance, plus. The “plus” must be some form of distinct
procedural separation between the various roles on the board. If a state has
no other safeguards in place, then sufficient process due in license
revocation hearings requires a higher clear and convincing standard.
New Jersey and Maine both utilize a preponderance of the evidence
standard for professional license revocation hearings, yet only New Jersey
provides its licensee sufficient procedural due process.160
1. New Jersey
The state of New Jersey serves as an example of a state that, while
strongly establishing and subsequently reaffirming a common law principle
of the preponderance of the evidence standard in professional license
revocation hearings, has also utilized numerous “plusses” to balance the
lower standard. As such, New Jersey provides its licensees sufficient due
process in the average adjudicatory hearing.
As detailed in Part III.A, the court in In re Polk found that the
preponderance of the evidence standard supplied sufficient procedural due
process under the Mathews test.161 However, the court also made note of the
various additional procedural safeguards New Jersey had established for its
licensees.162
For example, when the New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners
(BME) learns that a doctor has allegedly committed an offense, it begins a
preliminary hearing before a subcommittee called the Preliminary
Evaluation Committee.163 The subcommittee listens to the doctor’s
testimony and reviews and categorizes every complaint, determining which
cases are “no cause” (where no offense was committed), and which ones
have probable cause to continue in the disciplinary process.164 The
subcommittee subsequently reports those cases where it is believed that an
offense has been committed to the full BME and offers recommendations as
to how to proceed with each case.165 After deliberation, the BME will make
recommendations to the Attorney General’s office, which represents the

160

Infra Sections III.B.1–2.
Infra Section III.A.1.
162
Id.
163
Heumann, Pinaire & Lerman, supra note 154, at 12; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-19.8 (Westlaw
through L.2019, ch. 266 and J.R. No. 22) (“The State Board of Medical Examiners shall establish a
Medical Practitioner Review Panel.”).
164
Heumann, Pinaire & Lerman, supra note 154, at 12–13; see DIV. OF CONSUMER AFF., STATE
BD.
OF
MED.
EXAM’RS,
STATUTES
AND
REGULATIONS
47
(2006),
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ca/bme/bmelaws.pdf.
165
Heumann, Pinaire & Lerman, supra note 153, at 13.
161
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166

BME, as to how the AG should proceed. The Attorney General’s office
utilizes two deputy attorneys general to represent the BME in disciplinary
proceedings—one counseling the BME and the other prosecuting on behalf
of BME.167 If a formal complaint has been lodged, then there will be a
hearing.168 The BME has a choice of holding the hearing either before the
full BME or an administrative law judge (ALJ).169 When a hearing is held
before the ALJ, the ALJ issues an initial decision—essentially no more than
a recommendation—to the BME, which then reaches a final decision. Thus,
the BME’s action ultimately becomes permanent public record as a final
order.170
New Jersey has implemented impartiality and eliminated potential
biases throughout the entire complaint process. As such, a preponderance of
the evidence standard is sufficient in this state.
2. Maine
Maine serves as an example of the erroneous deprivation that can occur
when there is a lower evidentiary burden and limited (if any) separation of
functions on the board.
Maine has acknowledged that a person has a due process-protected
property interest in a professional license.171 But Maine has not decided the
requisite standard of proof for license revocation in either common law or
statute, and thus maintains a preponderance of the evidence standard for
license revocation hearings.172 Additionally, Maine contains no “plus”
safeguards.173

166

Id.
Id.
168
Id. at 14.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Balian v. Bd. of Licensure in Med., 722 A.2d 364, 367 (Me. 1999); see also Bd. of Overseers of
the Bar v. Lefebvre, 707 A.2d 69, 73 (Me. 1998) (discussing due process protections implicated in
hearing to suspend attorney’s license); Bd. of Registration in Med. v. Fiorica, 488 A.2d 1371, 1375 (Me.
1985) (discussing due process protections implicated in proceedings to revoke doctor’s license).
172
See Gashgai v. Bd. of Registration of Med., 390 A.2d 1080, 1084 n.5 (Me. 1978) (“Because of
our disposition of this appeal it becomes unnecessary to address the issue of burden of proof.”). But see
Bd. of Licensure in Med. v. Diering, No. AP-08-23, 2008 WL 9500435, at *3 (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 5,
2008) (“Although the Law Court has not explicitly recognized a default preponderance of the evidence
standard in Maine’s Administrative Procedure Act, this standard is common in professional disciplinary
cases . . . . [T]he rationale for applying the clear and convincing standard of proof does not apply to
license disciplinary proceedings. The clear and convincing standard ‘was first applied in equity to claims
which experience had shown to be inherently subject to fabrication, lapse of memory, or the flexibility
of conscience.’ . . . . No such concern in the context of a license disciplinary proceeding exists to justify
a departure from the general rule that requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” (citation
omitted)).
173
See infra Appendix A (Maine).
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In Maine, the board receives a complaint and assigns it to an investigator
who is either a single member of the board or a “committee” of the board
who presents findings to the full board. If a committee of the board
investigates, it should be prohibited from taking part in any portion of the
subsequent proceeding, but this is often not the case.174 The investigator(s)
will then present findings to the board with a recommendation. The board—
with help from its assigned Assistant Attorney General (AAG) serving as
general counsel—then decides whether discipline is warranted; if so, the
board forwards to prosecution for formal hearing. The same Assistant
Attorney General that advises the board to take the case175 then prosecutes
the case to the board. After the hearing, the board votes and issues a final
decision. Licensees can appeal back to the same full board.176
In Zegel v. Board of Social Work Licensure, the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court has said in dictum that “the combination of investigator, prosecutor,
and sitting member of the adjudicatory panel, even if ostensibly a
nonparticipating member, creates an intolerably high risk of unfairness.”177
Two of the most glaring of these are the roles of the investigator and
attorney. The investigator(s) will often present findings of the investigation
to the board with a recommendation, and then sit on the board for the
adjudicatory hearing—after having conducted an investigation and made a
recommendation to their colleagues.178 AAGs work with their assigned
boards on a daily basis as general counsel and have built rapport and trust
with the board members, which carries great persuasion during the AAG’s
prosecution of the case and when the board is tried with making a final
decision.
Moore v. State of Maine Board of Dental Examiners179 provides a good
example of the issues with the lack of separation in Maine license revocation
hearings. The petitioner in that case appealed a decision by the Board that
174
Compare Gashgai v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 390 A.2d 1080, 1082 n.1 (Me. 1978) (“[W]e
observe that the combination of investigator, prosecutor and sitting member of the adjudicatory panel,
even if ostensibly a nonparticipating member, creates an intolerably high risk of unfairness.”), with Brief
of Petitioner/Appellant at 2–3, Zegel v. State of Me. Bd. of Soc. Work Licensure, No. PEN-03-335 (Me.
July 10, 2003), 2003 WL 24222872 (Me) (noting that the Board of Social Work Licensure allowed a
committee member, who voted twice to advance the case to a formal hearing during the initial stages of
the investigation, to take part in subsequent proceedings as an expert witness for the prosecution).
175
Presumably advising on the legal analysis and why she believes it is a good case to try—belief
she can prove the licensee has violated the requisite standards.
176
Maine Administrative Procedure Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8001 (West, Westlaw
through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
177
Zegel v. Bd. of Soc. Work Licensure, 843 A.2d 18, 22 (Me. 2004) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Gashgai v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 390 A.2d 1080, 1082 n.1 (Me. 1987)). In Zegel, the court held
that it “need not determine whether the process here crossed the line because the error, if any, was
harmless.” Id. The court has yet to determine the issue.
178
Though they may not vote. See Maine Administrative Procedure Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
5, § 8001 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
179
No. AP-07-65, at *3–4 (Me. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2008).
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found he had violated Maine’s unprofessional conduct statute180 by
providing care that failed to meet minimum accepted standards of
practice.181 The complainant was “recommend[ed] and encourage[ed]”182 by
a member of the Board to file a complaint with the Maine Board of Dental
Examiners. This board member also testified at the hearing. One single
member of the Board recommended the complaint, initiated investigation,
testified at the hearing as an expert,183 and then sat on the Board and listened
to the rest of the Board debate the findings of a case he brought himself. In
closing argument, the AAG stressed the importance of weighing the
credibility of the witnesses.184
It is inconceivable to believe that the board member’s testimony, various
roles in the process, relationship to the Board, and presence at the proceeding
did not have an effect on the decision of the rest of the Board. The Superior
Court agreed:
The gloss put on the facts by the Board was impacted by the
knowledge that an important and influential member of the
Board believed this case to constitute a violation, treated the
patient, acted as a witness in front of the Board, and was the
person who recommended to petitioner that she file [the]
complaint . . . .185
Because the Maine legislature has not taken steps to restructure
administrative adjudicatory hearings, a higher clear and convincing standard
would help combat these biases and provide a barrier through which the
insufficient evidence would have had to break.
In applying the Mathews v. Eldridge186 three-factor test to Maine license
revocation procedure, factor two, “the risk of erroneous deprivation of such
interests through procedures used,”187 greatly tips the scale toward injustice
and a high risk of erroneous deprivation. Part of the risk of erroneous
180
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3282-A(2)(F) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.)
(“Unprofessional conduct. A licensee is considered to have engaged in unprofessional conduct if the
licensee violates a standard of professional behavior . . . that has been established in the practice for
which the licensee is licensed.”); id. § 3282-A(2)(E) (“Incompetence in the practice for which the licensee
is licensed. A licensee is considered incompetent in the practice if the licensee has: (1) Engaged in
conduct that evidences a lack of ability or fitness to perform the duties owed by the licensee to a client
or patient or the general public; or (2) Engaged in conduct that evidences the lack of knowledge or
inability to apply principles or skills to carry out the practice for which the licensee is licensed[.]”).
181
Moore, No. AP-07-65, at *1.
182
Id. at *2.
183
Dr. Fister’s testimony reveals multiple instances where he compared the work of petitioner with
what he would have done. Id.
184
Id. at *3 (“Had an appropriate radiograph been taken, such as Dr. Fister’s, the root tip would
have been visualized and the patient conformed, hopefully.”).
185
Id. at *4.
186
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
187
Id.
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injustice analysis is “the probable value, if any, of additional procedural
safeguards,”188 and Maine has almost none.189
Clearly, preponderance alone is not sufficient to protect the interests of
the licensees. If Maine is to keep the preponderance standard, which seems
likely, the State needs to implement additional procedural safeguards.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that licensees have a protected interest in their licenses that
requires sufficient procedural due process of law in revocation hearings. It
is equally clear that the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard
alone is not sufficient to provide licensees with due process of law. In order
for states to appropriately apply preponderance of the evidence in license
revocation hearings, there must be additional safeguards in place to protect
the licensee—“preponderance, plus.” Completely separate adjudicative
agencies for each step of the process is not required for sufficient due
process. In the example of Maine, a due process “plus” could take the form
of (1) adding additional seats to the Board so as to allow for the full removal
of the investigators from the rest of the hearing and still maintain quorum;
(2) adding additional seats to the Board so as to allow for the removal of the
committee who decides to bring the case to prosecution from the
adjudicatory hearing and still maintain quorum; and (3) having split board
duties so that one serves as general counsel and another prosecutes cases.
But sufficient due process dictates that if a board uses preponderance, it must
utilize a “plus.”

188

Id.
See infra Appendix A (displaying that Maine lacks most procedural safeguards that other
preponderance states have implemented).
189
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Appendix A
State

Hearing
Participants &
Procedures

Standards of
Proof
Required

State
APA
Citation

Board
Legal
Counsel

Investigator
Employment

AL

Administrative
Hearings
conducted
before the full
Commission.

“Substantial
evidence”
standard. ALA.
CODE § 34-24360 (West,
Westlaw
through Act
2019-540).

ALA.
CODE §
41-22-1
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
legislati
on).

In-house
counsel;
Attorney
General.

Board.

AK

Board
delegates to
hearing officer,
but may
choose to
conduct
hearing by full
board.

Preponderance
of evidence.
ALASKA STAT.
§ 44.62.460
(West,
Westlaw
through Sept.
14, 2019 of
the 2019 First
Regular Sess.
and 2019 1st
Special Sess.
of the 31st
Legislature).

ALASK
A STAT.
ANN. §
44.62.0
10
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
legislati
on).

Attorney
General.

Another
state agency.

AZ

Administrative
hearings are
conducted by
an independent
agency.

Clear &
convincing
evidence.
ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §
12-572 (West,
Westlaw
through 2019
Legis. Sess.).

ARIZ.
REV.
STAT.
ANN. §
41-1001
(West,
Westla
w
through
2018
legislati
on).

Attorney
General;
outside
counsel.

Board.
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AR

Conducted by
full board.

Preponderance
of evidence.

ARK.
CODE
ANN. §
25-15201
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
Legis.
Sess.).

Attorney
General;
outside
counsel.

Another
state agency.

CA

The panel of
board members
reviews &
approves
decisions after
stipulation or
hearing by a
hearing officer.

Clear &
convincing
evidence.
Ettinger v. Bd.
of Med.
Quality
Assurance,
135 Cal. App.
3d 853, 856
(1982).

CAL.
GOV’T
CODE §
11340
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
Legis.
Sess.).

In-house
counsel;
Attorney
General;
outside
counsel.

Another
state agency.

CO

Panel of board
members;
hearing officer.

Preponderance
of evidence.

Attorney
General.

Another
state agency.

CT

Panel of board
members;
hearing officer.

Preponderance
of evidence.

COLO.
REV.
STAT.
ANN. §
24-4107
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
Legis.
Sess.).
CONN.
GEN.
STAT.
ANN. §
4-166
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
Legis.

Attorney
General.

Another
state agency.

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

974

[Vol. 52:2

Sess.).
DE

Panel of board
members;
hearing officer.

Preponderance
of evidence.

DEL.
CODE
ANN.
tit. 29, §
10101
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
Legis.
Sess.).

Attorney
General.

Another
state agency.

DC

The board may
choose to hold
a hearing
before the full
board or a
panel of the
board. The
board may
choose to send
hearings to an
independent
hearing
tribunal instead
of holding
hearings
themselves.
Full board,
panel of board
members, or
hearing officer.

Preponderance
of evidence.
In re
Benjamin, 698
A.2d 434,
439–40 (D.C.
1997).

D.C.
CODE
ANN. §
2-502
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019).

Attorney
General.

Another
state agency.

Clear &
convincing
evidence.
FLA. STAT.
ANN. §
458.331
(West,
Westlaw
through 2019
1st Regular
Sess.).

FLA.
STAT.
ANN. §
120.51
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
Legis.
Sess.).

Attorney
General.

Another
state agency.

Full board,
panel of board
members, or
hearing officer.

Preponderance
of evidence.

GA.
CODE
ANN. §
50-13-1
(Westla
w,

In-house
counsel;
Attorney
General.

Board.

FL

GA
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through
2019
Session
of the
General
Assemb
ly).
HI

Regulated
Industries
Complaints
Office
investigates
allegations of
professional
misconduct by
licensee.

Preponderance
of evidence.

ID

Hearing
Officer.

Clear &
convincing
evidence.
IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 541837 (West,
Westlaw
through 2019
1st Regular
Sess.).

IL

Hearing
Officer.

Clear &
convincing
evidence.
ILL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 68, §
1110.190
(West,
Westlaw
through rules
published in
the Illinois

HAW.
ADMIN.
RULES §
16-20121(d)
(West,
Westla
w
through
Decemb
er 2019
Hawaii
Admini
strative
Rules
Listing
of
Filings).
IDAHO
CODE
ANN. §
67-5201
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
Regular
Sess.).

Attorney
General.

Another
state agency.

In-house
counsel;
Attorney
General;
outside
counsel.

Board.

5 ILL.
COMP.
STAT.
ANN.
100/1-1
(West,
Westla
w
through
P.A.
101-

Departm
ent
counsel.

Board.
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Register Vol.
43, Issue 37,
Sept. 13,
2019).

66).

IND.
CODE
ANN. §
4-21.51-1
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
Regular
Sess.).
IOWA
CODE
ANN. §
17A.1
(Westla
w
through
2019
Regular
Sess.).

Departm
ent
counsel;
Attorney
General.

Attorney
General.

In-house
counsel;
Attorney
General.

Board.

KAN.
STAT.
ANN. §
77-501
(West,
Westla
w
through
laws
effectiv
e on or
before
July 1,
2019,
enacted
during
the
2019
Regular
Sess. of

In-house
counsel.

Board.

IN

Full board.

Preponderance
of evidence.
Burke v. City
of Anderson,
612 N.E.2d
559, 565
(1993).

IA

Must have
quorum of 6–
10 board
members.

Preponderance
of evidence.
Eaves v. Bd. of
Med. Exam’rs,
467 N.W.2d
234, 237
(1991).

KS

Full board,
panel of board
members, or
hearing officer.

Preponderance
of evidence.
XXIX Kan.
Op. Att’y Gen.
22 (1995).
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the KS
Legislat
ure).

KY

Full board,
panel of board
members, or
hearing officer.

Preponderance
of evidence.

LA

Panel of board
members.

Clear &
convincing
evidence.
LA. SUP. CT.
R. 19 (2019).

ME

Full board.

Preponderance
of evidence.

KY.
REV.
STAT.
ANN. §
13A.10
0
(Westla
w
through
2019
Regular
Sess.).
L A.
STAT.
ANN. §
49:951
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
Regular
Sess.).
ME.
REV.
STAT.
ANN.
tit. 5, §
8002
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
1st
Regular
Sess.).

In-house
counsel.

Board.

In-house
counsel;
outside
counsel.

Board.

Attorney
General.

Board.
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MD

Board
conducts
hearing after
hearing officer
makes
recommendati
on.

Preponderance
of evidence.
MD. CODE
ANN., STATE
GOV’T § 10217 (West,
Westlaw
through 2019
legislation).

MA

Hearings at the
Administrative
Law Appeals;
sanction at
board meeting.

Preponderance
of evidence.
In re Budnitz,
681 N.E.2d
813, 814 n.1
(Mass. 1997).

MI

A central
agency handles
all hearings.

Preponderance
of evidence.

MN

Full board.

Preponderance
of evidence.
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MD.
CODE
ANN.,
STATE
GOV’T
§ 10101
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
legislati
on).
MASS.
GEN.
LAWS
ANN.
ch.
30A, §
1
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
legislati
on).
MICH.
COMP.
LAWS
ANN. §
24.201
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
legislati
on).

Attorney
General.

Board.

In-house
counsel;
Attorney
General.

Board.

Attorney
General.

Another
state agency.

MINN.
STAT.
ANN. §
14.001
(West,
Westla
w
through

Attorney
General.

Board.
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2019
legislati
on).
MS

Full board.

Preponderance
of evidence.

MISS.
CODE
ANN. §
25-431.101
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
legislati
on).

Attorney
General;
outside
counsel.

Board.

MO

Hearing
officer.

Preponderance
of evidence.

In-house
counsel.

Board.

MT

Hearing
officers
provided by
the
department.

Reasonable
cause.
MONT.
ADMIN. R.
42.2.512
(2019).

In-house
counsel.

Another
state agency.

NE

Hearing
officer.

Clear &
convincing
evidence.
NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. §
71-155 (West,
Westlaw
through 2019
Regular Sess.).

MO.
ANN.
STAT. §
536.010
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
legislati
on).
MONT.
CODE
ANN. §
2-4-101
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
legislati
on).
NEB.
REV.
STAT.
ANN. §
84-901
(West,
Westla
w
through

Attorney
General.

Another
state agency.
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2019
Regular
Sess.).
NV

Able to have
full board,
panel, or board
members hold
meeting but
use hearing
officers as
preferred
method.

Preponderance
of evidence.
NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §
630.346
(West,
Westlaw
through 2019
Legis. Sess.).

NH

Subcommittee
forwards all
Reports of
Investigations
to the board
with a
recommendati
on. Board then
determines
action.

Preponderance
of evidence.

NJ

Hearing
officers are
administrative
law judges.

Preponderance
of evidence.
In re Polk, 90
N.J. 550, 569
(1982).

NM

Individual
board members
may act as
hearing
officers or
board may
contract for
these services.

Preponderance
of evidence.

NEV.
REV.
STAT.
ANN. §
233B.0
10
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
Legis.
Sess.).
N.H.
REV.
STAT.
ANN. §
541-A:1
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
Regular
Sess.).
N.J.
STAT.
ANN. §
52:14B1
(Westla
w
through
L.2019,
ch.
246).
N.M.
STAT.
ANN. §
12-8-1
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019

In-house
counsel;
Attorney
General.

Board.

Attorney
General.

Board.

Attorney
General.

Another
state agency.

Attorney
General;
outside
counsel.

N/A.
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Regular
Sess.).

NY

Hearing
officer.

Preponderance
of evidence.
N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW
§ 230(10)(f)
(McKinney
2018).

NC

Full board.

Preponderance
of evidence.

ND

Hearing
officers are
administrative
law judges.

Preponderance
of evidence.
N.D. State Bd.
of Med.
Exam’rs v.
Hsu, 726
N.W.2d 216,
226 (2007).

OH

Hearing
officer.

Preponderance
of evidence.

N.Y.
A.P.A.
LAW §
102
(Westla
w
through
L.2019,
ch.
316).
N.C.
GEN.
STAT.
ANN. §
150B-1
(West,
Westla
w
through
2018
Regular
Sess.).
N.D.
CENT.
CODE
ANN. §
28-3201
(West,
Westla
w
through
2020
legislati
on).
OHIO
REV.
CODE
ANN. §
119.01
(West,
Westla

In-house
counsel;
Attorney
General;
outside
counsel.

Another
state agency.

In-house
counsel.

Board.

Attorney
General;
outside
counsel.

N/A.

In-house
counsel;
Attorney
General.

Board.
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w
through
133d
General
Assemb
ly
2019–
2020).
OK

Full board.

OR

Hearing
officers are
administrative
law judges.

PA

Hearing
officer.

Clear &
convincing
evidence.
OKLA. ADMIN.
CODE 435:3-311 (West,
Westlaw
through rules
published in
Vol. 36, No.
22 of the Okla.
Register dated
Aug. 1, 2019).
Preponderance
of evidence.
Gallant v. Bd.
of Med.
Exam’rs, 975
P.2d 814,
816–18 (Or.
Ct. App.
1999).

Preponderance
of evidence.

OKLA.
STAT.
ANN.
tit. 75, §
250
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
Regular
Sess.).

In-house
counsel;
Attorney
General.

Board.

OR.
REV.
STAT.
ANN. §
183.310
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
Regular
Sess.).
2 PA.
STAT.

Attorney
General.

Board.

Departm
ent
Counsel.

Another
state agency.

AND
CONS.
STAT.
ANN. §

101
(West,
Westla
w
through
2019
Regular
Sess.
Act 72).
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RI

Panel; no
member of the
board who
participated in
the
investigation
may participate
in any
subsequent
hearing or
action taken by
the remainder
of the board.

Preponderance
of evidence.

SC

Panel of one
lay member
and not more
than three
physician
members of
the Medical
Disciplinary
Commission,
none of which
may reside or
have a major
part of their
practice in the
same county as
the respondent.
Full board.

Preponderance
of evidence.
Anonymous
(M-156-90) v.
State Bd. of
Med. Exam’rs,
496 S.E.2d 17,
19 (S.C.
1998).

SD

Preponderance
of evidence.

983

42 R.I.
GEN.
LAWS
ANN. §
42-35-1
(West,
Westla
w
through
ch. 310
of the
2019
Regular
Sess.).
S.C.
CODE
ANN. §
1-23310
(Westla
w
through
2019
Sess.).

In-house
counsel.

Another
state agency.

In-house
counsel.

Another
state agency.

S.D.
CODIFIE
D LAWS
§ 1-261
(Westla
w
through
2019
Sess.
Laws,
Exec.
Order
19-1
and
Suprem
e Court
Rule

Attorney
General.

Board.
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19-18).

TN

Full board.

Preponderance
of evidence.

TX

The factfinding part of
the trial is done
by the State
Office of
Administrative
Hearings. The
penalty part is
done by the
full board.

Preponderance
of evidence.
Granek v. Tex.
State Bd. Of
Med. Exam’rs,
172 S.W.3d.
761, 777 (Tex.
App. 2005).

UT

Full board.

Preponderance
of evidence.

TENN.
CODE
ANN. §
4-5-101
(Westla
w
through
2019
1st
Regular
Sess. of
the
111th
Tenn.
General
Assemb
ly).
TEX.
GOV’T
CODE
ANN. §
2001.00
1
(Westla
w
through
the end
of the
2019
Regular
Sess. of
the 86th
Legislat
ure).
UTAH
CODE
ANN. §
63G-4101
(West,
Westla

Departm
ent
Counsel.

Another
state agency.

In-house
counsel;
Attorney
General.

Board.

In-house
counsel;
Attorney
General;
outside
counsel.

N/A.
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VT

VA

Hearing panels
hear contested
cases, make
recommendati
ons; full board
acts on record
created by
panel, may
take evidence.
Board
contracts with
a hearing
officer to
conduct
hearings; nonvoting member
of panel; role
is to advise,
preside over
hearing, rule
on procedural
matters, and
assist in
drafting
decision.
A formal
hearing
conducted by
a hearing
officer, a
panel of the
board or the
full board.
Members who
participate in
the informal
conference are
excluded from
the
subsequent
formal
hearing.

Preponderance
of evidence.
In re Miller,
989 A.2d 982,
991 (Vt.
2009).

Clear &
convincing
evidence.
1979–80 Va.
Op. Att’y
Gen. 168
(1979).

w
through
2019
General
Sess.).
VT.
STAT.
ANN.
tit. 3, §
800
(Westla
w
through
Acts of
the
Regular
Sess. of
the
2019–
2020
Vt.
General
Assemb
ly).

VA.
CODE
ANN. §
2.24000
(Westla
w
through
2019
Regular
Sess.).

985

Attorney
General;
outside
counsel.

Board.

Attorney
General;
outside
counsel.

Another
state
agency.
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WA

Panel.

Clear &
convincing
evidence.
Nguyen v.
Dep’t of
Health Med.
Quality
Assurance
Comm’n, 29
P.3d 689,
694–95
(Wash. 2001).

WASH.
REV.
CODE
ANN. §
34.05.0
10
(Westla
w
through
2019
Regular
Sess.).

In-house
counsel;
Attorney
General.

Board.

WV

Hearings
conducted by
full board.

Clear &
convincing
evidence.
W. VA. CODE
§ 30-3-14
(Westlaw
through May
3, 2020 of the
2020 Regular
Sess.).

In-house
counsel;
Attorney
General.

Board.

WI

Hearing
officer issues
a proposed
decision.
Board
considers and
issues final
decision.

In-house
counsel;
Attorney
General;
outside
counsel.

N/A.

WY

Hearing
officer
presides;
board
members hear
and decide the
case.

Preponderanc
e of evidence.
Gandhi v.
State Med.
Examining
Bd., 483
N.W.2d 295,
297 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1992).
Clear &
convincing
evidence.
WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 3326-407
(Westlaw
through the
2019 General
Sess. of the
Wyo.
Legislature).

W. VA.
CODE
ANN. §
29A-11
(Westla
w
through
2019
Regular
Sess.).
WIS.
STAT
ANN. §
227.03
(Westla
w
through
2019
Act 5).
WYO.
STAT.
ANN. §
16-3101
(Westla
w
through
2019
General
Sess.).

Attorney
General;
outside
counsel.

Board.

2020]
i

PREPONDERANCE, PLUS

987

This information is aggregated from FSMB, supra note 7; DHHS, supra note 57; and the
applicable state administrative procedure statutes.

